The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuais can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue, bidding behaviour, effects of entry fees and reserve prices, and other strategic issues.
Introduction
Suppose you own a unique object such as arare painting or a medieval fiftyroom castle. As there may not be established markets for the sale of either ·Paper prepared for the Australian Communications Authority Session on MultiUnit Auctions at the 1998 Australasian Econometric Society Meetings. I thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Billy Jack and Paulo K. Monteiro for useful comments. All errors remain my own.
1 of these commodities, you may decide to employ an auction. You will be able to obtain very clear advice about single-object auctions as there is a well-established theoryl based on the pioneer work of Vickrey (1961) and on the seminal paper of Milgrom and Weber (1982) . Now suppose you own several unique objects such as plots of land facing undeveloped parkland or 1-800 phone numbers that you can assign to particular individuaIs. Unfortunately, clear advice on how to proceed in this circumstance is not available -the theory of multi-object auctions is still in incipient formo Nevertheless, the theory of auctions of a single object can be applied here, albeit in a rather special case. Thus, the special case analysed in this paper is the auction of identical objects when individuals demand only one object.
In this context it is worth explaining the differences that might arise when analysing multi-object auctions vis-a-vis single-object auctions. When competing for a single object -assuming that we limit ourselves to auctions where the winner is the individual with the highest bid -each buyer will try to outbid everyone else. To do so, it suffices for· a bidder to outbid the opponent with the highest bid. Therefore, in some sense (i.e., in a symmetric equilibrium), each bidder can concentrate on estimating a single bid. Now suppose n bidders are competing for k identical objects with n > k.
Depending on the auction rules, it is possible that each individual bidder has to forecast up to k bids. However, when individuaIs only want one object and in the case of auctions where the bidders with the k highest bids win one object each, then each individuá! needs only to forecast a single bid -the highest of the other pIayers -in a symmetric equilibrium. Given this anaIogy, it is not surprising that both the intuition and the theoretical resuIts from single-ob ject auction theory appIy in this case.
Among auctions of identical objects we can distinguish between simultaneous sales -where objects are sold at the same time -and sequential sales -where objects are sold one after another in a pre-arranged fashion. To use the terminology of Weber (1983) , we can distinguish between simultaneousdependent auctions, in which bidders make only one bid and the objects are awarded based upon those bids, and simultaneous-independent auctions, in which bidders must simultaneously submit bids in several different auctions lThere are several surveys and introductory papers available, including EngelbrechtWiggans (1980), Klemperer (1998) , McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Milgrom (1985 Milgrom ( , 1987 Milgrom ( , 1989 , Riley (1989) and Wolfsetter (1997) .
of individual objects, and the award of an object to a bidder is independent of the awards of other objects. In a situation where individuaIs only want one object, simultaneous-independent auctions may expose a bidder to the risk of obtaining more than one object, which may cause inefliciencies. Thus, we will concentrate on simultaneous-dependent auctions and we will refer to such auctions as simultaneous auctions.
Sequential auctions are potentially more complex than simultaneous auctions because there may be reputation or signalling effects. For example, a buyer who has a very high valuation may not want to bid very aggressively in earlier rounds if she believes that by doing so she will convince other players that her valuation is low and, therefore, other players may take that into account when bidding for later units. N evertheless, we will show that under some circumstances, both sequential and simultaneous auctions may generate the same expected revenue. Moreover, both types of auctions can be made optimal -in the sense that they maximize the seller's expected revenue -by introducing a reserve price.
We will concentrate on the analysis of the following types of auctions of k objects with n bidders (n > k) with single-unit demand : simultaneousdependent discriminatory and uniform-price auctions, and sequential firstand second-price auctions. In a discriminatory auction, each of the k highest bidders pays the amount she bids. In a uniform-price auction, each bidder pays the amount of the k + 1 st highest bid, that is, the highest rejected bid. A first-price sequential auction is simply a sequence of k first-price sealed-bid auctions, where the winner in each round is the bidder with the highest bid and she pays her bid. A second-price sequential auction is defined similarly as a sequence of k second-price sealed-bid auctions where the winner in each round is the bidder with the highest bid and she pays the equivalent of the second highest bid in that particular auction.
Auction models typically fall into three categories. In private values model, each potential buyer knows her own value for the object, which is not infiuenced by how other potential buyers value it. If individuals' valuations are independent from each other -for example, one may think of valuations being determined by independent draws from a fixed distribution -then we have the independent private value (IPV) model. If valuations are dependent of each other, then we have a dependent private value model. A private values model might be most appropriate for nondurable goods with no resale value.
In the common value model, the object is worth the same to every pc-tential bidder, but this value is tmknown at the time of bidding. Typically, individuaIs have some information about the (tmknown) true vaIue of the object. If information is correlated across individuaIs, then we have a dependent common vaIue model. If information is independent across individuaIs, then we have an independent common vaIue model. The common value model is appropriate for analysing the sale of mineral rights and o:ffshore oil drilling leases. Finally, Milgrom and Weber (1982) introduce the notion of affi.liated vaIues, which includes both private and common values as special cases. Roughly speaking, affi.tiated vaIues capture the idea that individuaIs' valuations for an object have a private component but are influenced by how other people value it. In most sales we can imagine, a bidder's vaIuation for the object being sold does have a private component, but that valuation it is also influenced by her participation of other individuals' valuations. For instance, when bidding for a house, one takes into account both the personal vaIue of the house as well as how easily it would be to resell it in the future. 2 In general, the singIe-unit demand and independent private values assumptions oversimplify the problem by ignoring interesting and relevant issues. However, there are many examples where such assumptions might be justifiable. One such exampIe is the sale of randomly generated toll-free phone numbers where resaIe of the numbers is not allowed. Given the existing technology, firms will typically need only one such number. Given that resale is not allowed, bidding for a strategic reason will be limited. That is, the unit demand assumption seems reasonable in this case. Moreover, such phone numbers do not have any value per se. It is simpIy a salesjmarketing tool and its value to a firm might not be influenced by how other firms vaIue it. In addition, we may think of firms' values across di:fferent industries as being determined independently from each other. That is, the independent private values assumption might be justifiable.
Thus, in section 2 I present the main results for the IPV model. NameIy we will characterize bidding strategies for a family of auctions and show that these auctions should generate, on average, the same revenue. We will then characterise the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue, and examine the e:ffects of entry fees, reserve prices and increased competition. In section 3 we will discuss a more general mo deI and some of the results 2The discussion above relates to how individuals value objects. Of course, even in the IPV model, bidders' bidding behaviour wiIl depend on how they think others will bid. available from it. Section 4 outlines some of the existing research on multiunit auctions and some of the existing empirical evidence. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Independent-Private Value Model
Let Vi, i = 1, ... , n, denote player i's value for any of the k (k > n) identical objects. It is assumed that potential buyers demand only one object. Each buyer knows her own valuation but only knows the distribution of her opponents' valuations. It is assumed that bidder i's valuation (i = 1, ... , n) is determined by an independent draw from a fixed distribution F( v) with positive density f(v) on [O, v] . Buyers are assumed to be risk-neutral. For simplicity we consider the case when the seller assigns zero value for the objects.
For convenience, let VI' v2', ... , v~ denote the order statistics of the n draws. For instance, vI is the first-order statistics of ri, samples from this fixed distribution F(.), v2' is the second-order statistics from n samples, and so on. As we will use the uniform distribution on [0,1] in most of our examples, the next fact summarizes some important properties of this distribution. 
The equilibrium notion we use is that of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This notion, due to Harsanyi, is a natural extension of the concept of Nash equilibrium (each player's strategy is a best response to the best response of other players) to static games of incomplete information. In this case, each player chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff given that other players are also choosing strategies to maximize their expected payoffs. We will focus on symmetric equilibrium where every bidder chooses the same bidding function.
Sequential Auctions
We now look at first and second-price sequential auctions. As in the remainder of this survey, we start with an example and then we state the corresponding theorems. We ean note a few regularities in the above example. First, for each type of auetion, the expected revenue across rounds is the same. This can be understood as follows. There are two economic forces working. On one hand, there are fewer opportunities to win objects as the auction proceeds (inereased competition for later units); on the other hand, there are less competitors in later sales (the winner always drops out from the auction). The fact that these two effects eancel out in the above example is not a coincidence. Second, both auction types generate the same expected revenue. This is no coincidence either as the next theorem states.
Example 1

First-Price Sequential Auctions
We will solve the game backwards. At the end of the first round there are two potential buyers and one object left. This is simply a one-shot first-price auction where a bidder with value v bids in such a way to just outbid her opponent. Given that her own value is v, and considering that bids are increasing in values (one has to check that this is indeed the case in equilibrium)
Theorem 1 (Weber (1983) , Milgrom (1985) ) In the IPV model with n riskneutral bidders, k objects (n > k), single-unit demands, and no entry fees or reserve price, the following holds:
.. ,n, and l = 1, ... , k is the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sequential auetion.
.. , n, and l = 1, ... , k is the unique symmetric equilibrium of the secondprice sequential auction. iii. Both auction formats generate the same expected revenue, namely, kE[V k + 1 l. Moreover, the sequence of prices in each auction format is a martingale.
This expected revenue equivalence result holds more generally than in Theorem 1 above and it will be explained in more detail later. The martingale result can be understood as part of the equilibriurn condition. Perhaps it is easier to understand why different expected prices cannot occur in equilibriurn; given that the objects are identicaI, if an individual expects the price of the object to falI in Iater rounds, she will wait until then driving down the price in earlier rounds. By the same token, if bidders expect the price to rise in later rounds, then there will be additional competition in earlier rounds driving the price up in earlier rounds. This is simply a restatement of the law of one price. 4 
Simultaneous Auctions
We motivate our analysis with a simple example of simultaneous discrirninatory and uniform-price auctions. 
Uniform-Price Auction
Each bidder submits a sealed-bid. 5 The individuaIs with the two highest bids win one object each and pay the price equivalent to the highest losing bid. 6 We claim that an individual with value v bids, in the symmetric equilibrium, according to the function 4In section 4 we mention an empiricalliterature reporting violations of the law of one price in sequential auctions and some of the theoretical explanations for the such violations.
5For some of the complications that might arise when multiple bids are allowed see, for example, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979) 6In the IPV model, this auction format is strategically equivalent to an oral auction formalized as follows. Bidders bid by pressing a button. Bidding starts at a low price which is increased continuously. The auction ends when one of the bidders releases the button -stopping the increase in the price -with the remaining two bidders winning one object each. Each winner pays the same price, namely the price at which the other bidder has released the button. 
.. ,n, is the uni que symmetric equilibrium of uniform-price auction. 
Revenue Equivalence
From the above theorems we can conclude that all the four auction formats considered -first and second-price sequential auctions and uniform-price and discriminatory auctions -generate the same expected revenue for the seller. This is indeed a special case of a more general resulto Consider any auction format where the individuaIs with the k highest bids win one object each. Let us examine this generic auction format from the point of view of one of the players, say Player 1. Suppose the bidding strategies of Players 2, ... , n are fixed. Player l's choice of strategy determines a probability of winning one of the objects, p, and an expected payment, e. Given independence of values, Player 1 's problem is to choose a bidding strategy b 1 , given that her value is VI, to maximize vIP(b 1 ) -e(bd.
Our definition of equilibrium implies that each bidder i solves a differential equation relating the particular Pi and ei that Player i faces. Thus, in equilibrium, all the n functions ei are determined by the n functions PiS and by n boundary conditions. As the seller's expected revenue is simply the sum of the expected payments from the n bidders, it is also determined by the PiS. The boundary condition is such that a bidder with the lowest possible value must make an expected payment of zero. This is summarized in the next theorem. One ean readily eheck that the four auetion formats eonsidered above satisfy the eonditions of the theorem. Given that bids are increasing in values, the individuaIs with the k highest values win one objeet eaeh. Moreover, an individual with the lowest possible value, zero, bids zero in alI four auetion formats.
The above theorem, referred to as Revenue Equivalence Theorem, is one of the most eelebrated results in the auetion theory literature. The assumptions driving this result are risk-neutrality, independenee, symmetry and single-unit demands. Indeed, revenue equivalenee falls apart when any of these assumptions is violated. For example, by relaxing the risk-neutrality assumption, we obtain that the diseriminatory auction yields more revenue than the uniform-priee auetion. This ranking is reversed when we assume that values are eorrelated instead of independent. (More on these issues later). There are several problems that arise when we relax either symmetry7 or single-unit demand. 8 
The Optimal Auction and the effects of reserve prices and entry fees
We now investigate the following questiono Can we design an auetion that maximizes the expeeted revenue of the seller? For the IPV model, the answer is yes. To motivate our analysis, let us revisit example 2 and coneentrate on the uniform-price auetion. It follows from the above theorem that the auctions considered in exampIes 1 and 2 are optimaI 9 when the reserve price is set at
The optimal reserve price from exampIe 3 can be understood as follows.
Suppose that the reserve price is equal to vo. The experiment is to evaluate the effect on the seller's expected revenue of an increase in the reserve price to Vo+é. The seller obtains an extra é if she is abIe to extract extra surpIus from one ofthe three buyers with a vaIue greater or equal than VO+é. This happens with probability 3v5 (1 -Vo -é). On the other hand, the seller's expected revenue is reduced by the whole amount Vo if the highest bid (i.e., value)
is between Vo and Vo + é. The probability of this event is 3V5 (vo + é -Vo) .
Therefore, the change in the seller's expected revenue, d(é), from increasing the reserve price from Vo to Vo + é is given by
Dividing both sides by é and taking the Iimit as é -+ O, we obtain that Vo = ~. This is just another way to see that this vaIue of the reserve price
maximizes the seller's expected revenue; Vo is simply the average between the seller's value and highest possible value of any of the bidders.
There are a few issues regarding the above theorem that are worth mentioning. First, note that the optimal reserve price does not depend on the number of potential bidders, n. Second, since the reserve price is above the seller's value for the object (which was assumed to be zero in the analysis above), the optimal auction mechanism may not be ex-post efficient. In example 3, with Vo = ~ there is a ~ chance that none of the two objects are sold and a ~ chance that one of the objects is not soldo (Efficiency requires all two objects to be sold as the selIer's value is equal to zero.)
At the same time, the auction formats considered in examples 1 and 2 and alI auction formats described in Theorem 3 are efficient. This leads us to the final issue regarding Theorem 4, namely that there is an implicit assumption that the selIer has to commit herself not to sell any unsold objects in the future. There is no definite answer yet for the characterization of the optimal auction when the seller cannot make such commitment. The answer will depend, however, on the nature of the secondary market. Moreover, it is not difficult to see that a selIer could achieve the maximised value of the expected revenue by instead resorting to entry fees or a combination of reserve price and entry fees. The distinction, of course, is that with a reserve price the seller extracts more surplus from the winner whereas with an entry fee the extra surplus is extracted from every bidder who participates in the auction.
ll It should not be surprising either that the selIer's expected revenue increases with the number of potential buyers in the IPV model. This follows from the fact that, in the absence of a reserve price, the expected revenue is simply k times the expected value of the kth-order statistics. This expected lOSee, for example, McAfee (1993) who shows that, for a special dynamic model, the optimal auction is such that the reserve price is set at the seller's valuation. 11 Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) and Levin and Smith (1994) consider a single-object auction model where bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction without knowing their values for the object. In this context again the seller should not resort to entry fees or to reserve price above the seller's value. The reason is that bidders are ex-ante identical. Therefore" the private gain from further entry equals the gain to society. Menezes and Monteiro (1997-a) consider a single-object model where bidders decide whether or not to enter after seeing their values. They show that, as in the standard model, the seller should charge a reserve price or an entry fee (or a combination of both).
value increases with n as the expected value of the any order statistics increases with n. 12 In the optimal auction, the value of Vo does not change with n, but the probability that there will be at least k bidders with values above Vo does increase with n and so does the seller's expected revenue.
The effect of risk aversion
The revenue equivalence result of section 2.3 is quite remarkable. This result, however, breaks down when agents are risk averse. Let us revisit example 2 to illustrate the effects of risk aversion ·on bidding behaviour. Milgrom (1985) explains, a small increase tlb 12Menezes and Monteiro (1997-a) show that for a single-object IPV model with endogenous participation the seller's expected revenue may or may not increase with the number of potential bidders. The reason is that entry has two effects. On one hand, an additional potential bidder tends to increase competition and, therefore, increase seller's expected revenue. On the other hand, an additional potential bidder reduces the ex-ante profits to the winner and, therefore, causes the cut-off value that determines which bidders will enter to increase. The ranking of auction formats obtained above holds in a more general setting as stated next.
Theorem 5 (Matthews (1979) , Holt (1980) , Maskin and Riley (1980) , Harris and Raviv (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1982) , Weber (1983) , Milgrom (1985) In the IPV model with n bidders who are equally risk averse, k objects (n > k), and single-unit demands, the discriminatory auction generates higher expected revenue than the uniform-price auction.
The carrelated values madel
In many auctions we do expect bidders's valuations for the identical objects to be influenced by how other bidders value them. Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
Some empirical evidence and extensions
The IPV model of single-demand auctions yields very precise predictions for bidding behaviour, selIer's expected revenue, the design of optimal auctions and the effects of reserve prices, entry fees and increased competition. The correlated values model yields less precise predictions -for example, we do not know what the optimal auction should look like -but still provides us with very solid principIes such as the ranking of auctions according to expected revenue. There are several empirical papers that examine both simultaneous and sequential multi-unit auctions. Although these papers are not tests of the theory per se as some of the assumptions are not satisfied, they indicate the direction to which the standard single-demand auction theory might be generalized.
Among the papers that examine sequential auctions, Ashenfelter (1989) made pairwise comparisons of the prices for identical wine sold in the same lot size in three auction houses from 1985 to 1987. Although the most common pattern was for prices to remain constant, prices were at least twice as likely to decline as to increase. McAfee and Vincent (1993) adopted a similar approach to Ashenfelter and examine data from Christie's wine auctions at Chicago in 1987. In addition to pairwise comparisons they examined triples of identical wine sold in the same auction sale. Their results are very similar to those of Ashenfelter. These empirical findings show a violation of the prediction that identical objects should fetch, on average,the same price.
Similar price anomalies have been identified in a number of other markets where sequential auctions are used; cable television licenses (Gandal (1995) ; condominiums (Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) , and Vanderporten (1992-a,b); commercial real estate (Lusht, 1994), dairy cattle (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1992); stamps (Taylor (1991) and Thiel and Petry (1990)); and wool (Jones, Menezes and Vella (1998)). 15 Most of the empiricalliterature on simultaneous auctions look at different aspects of Treasure bill auctions. For example, Cammack (1991) uses data from the D.S. market to show that the auction price of a bill is lower than the comparable secondary market price. Bayazitoglu and Kiefer (1997) examine Treasury bill auctions in Turkey and conclude that bidders' use a simple decision rule: bidders form minimum and maximum bid prices based on the result of the previous auctions. Gordy (1996) uses data from treasury bill auctions in Portugal to examine how bidders might submit multiple bids to hedge against the winner's curse. Finally, Tenorio (1993) examines data from Zambian foreign exchange auctions and concludes that uniform-price auctions generate more revenue and attract more bidders than discriminatory auctions.
The markets featured in this empirical literature differ from the above model in at least two dimensions. First, in these markets bidders typically demand more than one object. Second, in many cases similar but nonidentical objects are soldo Thus, the empirical literature does suggest that the predictions of the above model would not go through in more general settings. Indeed, now there is a growing literature that stresses the complications that arise when bidders' strategies spaces involve both prices and quantities. 16 There is also a theoretical literature that relaxes the identical objects hypothesis in the context of sequential auctions with and without the single-demand assumptionY Vnfortunately, however, these papers are still short of providing a general theory of multi-unit auctions. Nevertheless, the recent interest generated by the spectrum auctions in the V.S., Australia and elsewhere has generated some additional research 18 
Conclusion
Consider the sale of identical objects in which potential buyers can only buy one such number and resale is not possible. If each buyer knows her value for the objects and this value is not influenced by how others value it, then the IPV model is appropriate. In this case, any of the four formats considered -the simultaneous discriminatory and uniform-price auctions and the sequential first and second-price auctions -yield the same revenue when agents are risk neutral. In addition, under the assumptions of the 16See, for example, Ausubel and Cramton (1996) , Menezes(1996) , Tenorio (1997) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998-a,b) .
17Papers in the first category include Menezes (1993) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) and Bernhardt and Scoones (1994) . Menezes and Monteiro (1997-b) fall into the second category.
18See, for example, McMillan (1994) and McAfee and McMillan (1996) and the special issue of the Journal of Economic Strategy and Management (September, 1997).
Revenue Equivalence Theorem, any of these four auctions will maximize the seller's expected revenue if an appropriate reserve price is chosen.
If bidders are risk-averse, then the revenue equivalence breaks down; for example, the discriminatory auction generates more revenue than the uniform-price auction. The revenue equivalence might also break down if buyers' values are infl.uenced by how others value the phone numbers. In particular, if values are affiliated then the uniform-price auction generates more revenue than the discriminatory auction. In this case, however, it is not known what format the optimal auction should take.
In summary, auction theory yields a series of predictions when identical objects are sold in a market where buyers can only buy one object and resale is not allowed. Auction theory, however, is yet to be generalized to the case where potential buyers demand more than one object. 
